3 the methodological questions raised in the previous immigration literature. First, a country sample may reduce any mobility of immigrants or natives that might otherwise mask immigration effects. Second, and most importantly, we experiment with an instrumental variables (IV) strategy, as well as reporting OLS and fixed-effects estimates. The IV estimates exploit the two 1990s Balkan Wars (in Bosnia and Kosovo) as a source of exogenous variation providing a shock to immigrant flows. During this period, many immigrants and refugees came from former Yugoslavia. As a consequence, the distance between European population centers and the former Yugoslav republics is highly correlated with the wartime proportion of the labor force from non-EU countries, while essentially uncorrelated with the foreign share from EU countries. We implement an estimation strategy based on this variation by using the distance from Sarajevo and the distance from Pristina, interacted with dummies for the war years, as instruments for the immigrant share.
I. Theoretical Framework
We use a competitive model with two types of labor and exogenous separations to illustrate the standard theoretical predictions regarding the impact of that immigrants on natives, and to suggest how the effect of immigrants on native employment might be modified by differences in labor market institutions, such as firing costs. Our theoretical setup is similar to that used in earlier analyses of immigration questions, augmented with elements used by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) and Saint Paul (1996) to study the effects of labor market regulation and employment protection.
Firm output is assumed to be produced by immigrants and natives with production function, where N t is the number of natives (or nationals) and I t is the number of immigrants (or non-nationals). The variable g t is a CES-type labor aggregate as in Card (2001) ; output depends on other factors of production, but this is ignored in the notation. The variable θ t is an exogenous shifter as in Lalonde and Topel (1991) . 4 As in Angrist and Acemoglu (2001) , productivity shocks are high enough and firing costs low enough that laying off unproductive workers is indeed worthwhile. In practice, productivity may be endogenous and determined in part by employment protection (see Ichino and Riphahn, 2000 , for evidence). We ignore hiring costs since adjustment costs are linear in our model (as in Saint-Paul, 1996) .
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The first derivative of the production function, f(·), is positive and the second derivative is negative. Our approach differs modestly from others in the literature in that we have CES interaction between immigrants and natives as a group. In Altonji and Card (1991) , for example, immigrant-native complementarity is generated by differences in the skill or education mix of the two groups, with immigrants and natives at the same skill level being perfect substitutes. This approach is harder to motivate in the European context, since immigrants to the EU are not dramatically less educated than natives. Immigrants with the same measured skills may also complement natives because of language or craft skills.
An important feature of many European labor markets is high firing costs. These come in the form of bureaucratic limitations on dismissals, requirements for severance pay, and restrictive collective bargaining agreements. On the other hand, immigrants are probably less likely than natives to be covered by these provisions since immigrants are more likely to work in non-union jobs, on fixed-term contracts (e.g., if they have only temporary work permits), or illegally. We therefore introduce positive firing costs in the amount C N for natives, with no firing costs for immigrants. Firing costs are paid when, every period, a proportion λ of the labor force becomes unproductive in the current job, and is therefore laid off. 4 Immigrants and natives are paid different real wages, w Nt and w It , with the price of output as numeraire.
Our interest is in immigration effects and interactions with institutions in a simple dynamic setup.
We assume price-taking firms act to maximize the present value of profits, with discount factor φ. In this case, firms' objective functions can be written, 
where g N and g I are derivatives of g [N, I] . Equation (2a), which implicitly defines the demand function for native labor, equates the flow cost of native workers with their marginal product. The flow cost of employing immigrants is just the immigrant wage. Note that firing costs are now defined as proportional to the native wage: c N /C N /w N , a ratio that we take to be fixed.
The labor supply of immigrants is assumed to be perfectly inelastic, at least for the range of wage levels observed in the host country. The immigrant population is denoted by M, employed in equal numbers at each of m identical firms, so that I=M/m. In contrast, native labor supply is elastic and determined by a second institutional characteristic, unemployment insurance replacement rates, as well as by wages. The distinction between immigrant and native labor supply seems reasonable since natives are more likely than immigrants to have access to social insurance. The native labor supply function is
where P is the native population, r is the UI or social insurance replacement rate, and ε is the native labor supply elasticity, assumed to be positive. For what follows, it is useful to define the inverse labor supply function, w N (N, ε) /(mN/P)
The short-run analysis of this model takes the number of firms, m, to be fixed, while the long-run response is determined by allowing m to be endogenous and determined by the condition that profits are greater than entry costs. In the short run, equations (2a), (2b), and (3) determine the two endogenous wage levels, and the number of employed natives. Since immigrant labor supply is exogenous, the key equilibrium condition can be written as follows
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If there are no firing costs and f(·) is linear, so the production function is constant-returns CES with labor inputs alone, then the left hand side of (4) can be written as a linear combination of lnN, lnI, and the log of the immigrant share. 
This equation determines native employment, which can then be substituted back into the labor supply equation to find native wages.
Equation (4) provides a basis for the empirical work in this paper. Following Lalonde and Topel (1991) , we think of the estimates, which relate the log of native employment to the log of the immigrant share in the labor force, as approximating lnfN(θg) + lng N to first order in logs.
The estimating equation is assumed to hold at the country level since we imagine all firms are identical except possibly for the shift variable, θ, which is assumed to be absorbed by country and year effects. Before turning to the empirical results, we use this theoretical framework to suggest the likely nature of interactions between labor market institutions and immigration. In particular, we are interested in the short-run impact of immigration on total native employment, N * /mN, and the question of whether MN * /MM changes with firing costs, c N ; replacement rates, r; and the degree of native wage flexibility. We also consider long-run impacts and the interaction between immigration and barriers to entry.
The short-run employment impact of immigration can be written in elasticity terms as follows,
where ξ NI and ξ NN are the elasticities of factor price for native wage rates with respect to native and immigrant employment. That is, ξ NN =(Mw N /MN)(N/w N ) and ξ NI =(Mw N /MI)(I/w N ) along the demand curve for native labor.
We use the e(N, ε) shorthand for dlnN * /dlnM to highlight the fact that parameters other than the labor supply elasticity modify the immigrant impact through native employment levels. This expression, derived in the appendix, is similar to the corresponding relationship in Johnson's (1980) static model, though in our case, immigration has an ambiguous effect on native employment. While ξ NN is negative, so the denominator is The appendix shows ∆ to be [(1/ε)N -1
-(fNN/fN)θg N -g NN /g N ] > 0. Firing costs reduce employment in our model with cross-sectional employment differences, but have an ambiguous effect in partial-equilibrium models with cyclical shocks (as in Bentolila and Bertola, 1990) . In a general-equilibrium setting, firing costs also reduce profitability and investment, with consequent job losses (see Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993) . 7 positive, ξ NI in the numerator can be positive or negative depending on the extent of immigrant-native complementarity. In a setup like ours, however, immigration is predicted to reduce native wage rates for most plausible parameter values (see, e.g., Altonji and Card, 1991; Ichino, 1993) , in which case e(N, ε) is negative. If immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes (ρ=1), then ξ NI and e(N, ε) are necessarily negative. Assuming ξ NI is negative, as we do in the discussion which follows, immigration reduces native employment, with larger effects when native labor supply is more elastic.
To see how the employment effects predicted by (5) are affected by changes in firing costs, note that c N does not appear directly in the derivative e(N, ε). Thus, any change in employment response is due to the impact of firing costs on employment levels. That is,
It is clear from (4) that firing costs reduce employment in this model. In particular,
where ∆ is (1/N) times the denominator in (5).
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The scale effect, Me/MN, is likely to be positive, i.e., there is less native job loss due to immigration when N is larger. To see this, it is useful to write out the scale effect as follows:
The wage decline for natives from a given percentage increase in immigrants will likely be smaller (in absolute value) the more natives there are, so the first term on the right hand side is typically positive. The second term is also positive if Mξ NN /MN is negative. Standard results from demand theory suggest this is a reasonable presumption: in a constant-returns, two-factor model, demand becomes less elastic as factor shares increase, so ξ NN becomes more negative as N grows (see Hammermesh, 1986 ).
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These considerations suggest scale effects are indeed positive and therefore the employment loss due to immigration is probably made worse by firing costs. The intuition for this result is straightforward: firing costs reduce native employment levels in our set-up, and reduced employment makes the negative employment consequences of a given number of immigrants worse. Of course, as an empirical matter, scale effects may be small or hard to measure, and, at least in the short run, firing costs are likely to protect incumbent native workers from dismissal.
The analysis of changing r parallels the discussion of firing costs since replacement rates do not appear directly in (5). Note that
Similarly, (5) implies that higher replacement rates reduce native employment levels, in this case
/∆ < 0, so higher replacement rates increase any job loss due to immigration. The intuition for this result is the same as for the interaction with firing costs: high replacement rates reduce native employment levels, and reduced employment makes the negative employment consequences of immigration worse.
We omit a detailed analysis of the impact of union wage setting or minimum wages, but look briefly at a stylized model of inflexible wages. Suppose that native wages are fixed at a binding minimum or contract wage, w G N . Then the effect of immigration on native employment can be shown to be
which is e(N, ε) with ε=4, and is clearly more negative than e(N, ε) with ε unrestricted. This is the first-order effect; a higher w G N also reduces employment, leading to the same sort of scale effect discussed earlier for firing costs and replacement rates. Since the wage-setting mechanism is not specified, our analysis omits any feedback effects whereby union wage demands are moderated as a consequence of competition from immigrants. In a fully-specified bargaining scenario, as in Schmidt, Stilz, and Zimmermann (1994) , immigration may reduce displacement effects by moderating union wage demands.
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Even if native wages were to rise due to immigrant-native complementarity, it can be shown that profits increase as long as the overall production function exhibits diminishing returns.
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A. Long-run Effects Suppose now that the number of firms, m, is an endogenous variable eventually determined by the requirement that profits equal entry costs. To see the consequences of endogenous m for immigration effects, we first analyze the effect of immigration on profits. The effect of an increase in M on profits with a fixed number of firms is approximately
where N is the equilibrium employment level of natives. This expression is derived by observing that the envelope theorem allows us to ignore terms in MΠ/MN and MΠ/MI. In the short run, increased immigration clearly increases profits in this model because immigrant wages must fall and native wages have been presumed to fall in our previous discussion. As Borjas (1995) notes, the increase in profits due to immigration is generated because, while the last workers hired is still paid value of marginal product, inframarginal workers are paid less. The exception is if there are there are constant returns for labor inputs alone, i.e., fNN(·)=0, in which case profits are always zero and there may be no entry. Assuming profits were equal to entry costs before immigration and there are diminishing returns to labor inputs, the increase in profits after immigration induces the entry of new firms. Because the entering firms employ additional workers, both immigrant and native, the possibility of endogenous entry reduces and may even eliminate any negative impact of immigration on native employment. To see this, note that with free entry, the effect of immigration on aggregate employment can be show to be
where e(N, ε) is the short-run employment response defined in equation (5). This long-run impact is derived in the appendix. Since ξ NN <0 and Mlnm/MlnM #1, the response with entry is less negative than in the fixednumber-of-firms case and can even be positive. With perfect substitution, i.e., ρ=1, the short-run impact of 8 See Bertrand and Kramarz (2001) for recent evidence on the employment consequences of entry costs in the retail industry in France. 10 immigration on native employment is necessarily negative, but the long-run impact is zero.
Although entry may eventually raise employment back to pre-immigration levels, in the theoretical medium-run, immigrants will have a diminished, though still negative effect on native employment. So factors that inhibit entry are likely to increase or prolong the displacement of natives by immigrants.
Moreover, entry costs probably interact with other wage rigidities, such as firing costs and sticky wages, to aggravate job losses from immigration for two reasons. First, factors that increase labor costs will tend to reduce or slow the entry of firms in response to low-cost immigrant labor. Second, entry costs that reduce native employment levels will interact negatively with other rigidities because of the short-run scale effect.
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On balance, therefore, our model clearly predicts an association between barriers to entry and native job losses due to immigration.
Overall, the theoretical discussion suggests that the relationship between immigration and native employment is likely to vary across countries according to employment laws, replacement rates, wage-setting institutions, and business entry costs. The impact of unions is hard to measure since most Western Europeans are covered by collective bargaining agreements whether or not they are union members. We therefore focus on interactions with measures of labor market flexibility, replacement rates, and barriers to entrepreneurship. To establish a baseline, however, we begin with a reduced-form analysis of immigration effects that omits interactions with institutional characteristics.
II. Background and Data Description
A. Descriptive Statistics OECD and other EEA countries have long been host to refugees and economic migrants. In recent years, the European countries with the largest proportion of labor force from non-EU countries have been 9 Information on data sources and extracts is provided in the data appendix.
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Austria, France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. This can be seen in Table 1 The flow from former Yugoslavia became an important part of the European migration picture after 1990. This flow was generated by the collapse of the Yugoslav state, and especially by the Bosnian and Kosovo wars at the beginning and end of the decade. Figure 2 shows that the number of former Yugoslavian asylum-seekers peaked in 1992, the year that Bosnia-Herzegovina became an independent state and Bosnian Serbs laid siege to Sarajevo, and again in 1999, when NATO launched air strikes on Yugoslavia. Figure 2 also shows that Yugoslavs accounted for more than 30 percent of all asylum-seekers in the war years.
Yugoslav asylum seekers were a significant part of the total foreign inflow, with wartime modes at 10-15 percent. Since many foreigners in EU countries come from other EU countries, the effect of the Yugoslav asylum seekers on the non-EU foreign share is considerably larger than indicated by the figure. Our data show that in the 1995-99 period, for EU countries with information on immigrants' country of origin, roughly one-third of male immigrants aged 20-59 from non-EU countries were from former Yugoslavia.
The importance of migration within the EU is also documented in Table 1 . In some countries, many non-national residents in the labor force are from other developed European nations. Luxembourg is a clear outlier, with over one-third of its labor force from other EU countries. France is more typical, with 2-3 percent of its labor force from other EU countries. In the analysis below, we distinguish between EU and non-EU foreigners, and use this distinction to control for intra-EU migration that potentially responds to the number of non-EU immigrants.
B. Nationality Versus Nativity
The immigration statistics in Table 1 are based on a distinction between home-country nationals and resident non-nationals, the latter group consisting of what Europeans typically call "foreigners" and what Americans refer to as "resident aliens". Most discussions of immigration in Europe use an immigrant definition based on nationality. Thus, ethnic Germans moving to Germany are not counted in a nationalitybased definition of immigrants, while any immigrants who become naturalized citizens cease to be identified as immigrants on a nationality basis. In contrast, in Australia, the US, and Canada, countries with a long tradition of immigrant absorption, immigrants are usually defined by nativity; i.e., an immigrant is any foreign-born resident whether or not a citizen of the host country. Countries defining immigrants by nativity tend to have higher naturalization rates than countries using nationality definitions.
The LFS data allow us to explore the overlap between alternative definitions of immigrant status in 10 We have data on country of birth only for 1992-99. Statistics for 1996 are typical of this period. A shortcoming of the LFS data is that the national sampling frames are mostly limited to private households, therefore missing immigrants in relocation camps and hostels. This may affect descriptive statistics for the immigrant population, but is probably less important for samples of labor force participants.
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Most EU countries now have provisions for the naturalization of native-born children of non-nationals at age 18. For example, Germany's 1990 Act of Naturalization "specifically extended naturalization to young foreigners who have lived in Germany for a long time and wish to remain there." (OECD, 1995, p. 166 The first two columns of Table 2 report the proportion of non-nationals who are foreign born, separately for EU and non-EU nationals. The statistics in the table are for men and women aged 20-59.
These columns show that in all countries for which we have data on country of birth, almost all of those with non-EU nationality were foreign born. Thus, among adults, most non-nationals are indeed immigrants.
On the other hand, columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 show that many foreign born residents of EEA countries became naturalized citizens, or were granted citizenship on the basis of ethnicity at the time they arrived in the host country. In France, for example, about half of the residents born in a non-EU country obtained French citizenship. This figure probably includes a large number of people from former French colonies, including people of French ancestry or mixed descent.
Naturalization rates for non-Europeans are surprisingly high overall, but the last two columns show that few recent arrivals were naturalized. These columns report naturalization rates for foreign born residents who arrived in the last five years, separately for EU and non-EU countries of birth. For example, for those born in non-EU countries, the recent-arrival naturalization rate is essentially zero in France, 9 percent in Belgium, and 7 percent in the UK. This is not surprising since many EU countries impose an extensive waiting period before naturalization is possible.
In many countries, naturalization rates are lower for recent arrivals born in other EU countries than for those born outside the EU. This probably reflects increasing mobility between EU member states, and the fact that EU citizenship in any country already grants many citizenship privileges in other EU countries.
Another interesting feature of the table is the relatively high naturalization rate for recent arrivals in Germany and Greece. As noted earlier, this reflects a preponderance of same-ethnicity migrants coming from the former Soviet Union and (in the case of Greece) Albania. On balance, however, the statistics in Table 2 suggest that for most countries, the group of non-nationals can be seen as roughly coincident with the group of recently-arrived foreign born residents. Following the theoretical discussion, we briefly explore the implications of the nationality/nativity distinction for our estimates.
C. Immigrant Employment Policies and Immigrant/Native Comparisons
Before turning to the estimates, we briefly discuss government policies and a few statistics relating to the ease of labor-market access for European immigrants. The OECD (e.g., 1999a) migration volumes describe select aspects of immigration policies in the EU. Of special relevance for our study is the treatment of immigrants and asylum-seekers from Yugoslavia since we use the Balkan Wars as a source of exogenous variation in immigrant flows. Official policy appears to allow many of these people to work, at least around the time of the Bosnia war.
In Austria, which absorbed 100,000 Bosnian refugees between 1992 and 1995, the majority of Bosnians have a long-term work entitlement. Germany has made it more difficult to obtain asylum since 1993, but the largest number of asylum seekers come from former Yugoslavia, and many work permits were apparently issued to asylum seekers and other foreigners, especially in 1994 and 1995. Italy saw a tripling of foreign employment between 1990 and 1997, a large decline in unemployment among foreigners, and a large expansion of service-sector employment fueled by immigrants, in spite of the fact that an estimated 89% of asylum seekers entered Italy illegally in recent years. In Sweden in 1998, the largest immigrant group in the labor force after the Fins were those from former Yugoslavia. A special visa program for Bosnians and other parts of the former Yugoslavia operated in Sweden from 1993-96. The largest number of migrants to Switzerland between 1994 and 1997 also came from former Yugoslavia; the largest group of non-EU workers in Switzerland in this period were Yugoslavs.
Participation rates for immigrants are typically below those for natives, but most immigrant men aged 15 20-59, including those from former Yugoslavia, are in the labor force. This can be seen in Table 3 , which reports labor-force participation rates for natives and non-EU immigrants, with statistics for immigrants shown separately for those arriving in the past 5 years (recent arrivals) and those arriving earlier (veteran immigrants). The table reports statistics averaged for all available years from 1995-99 since this is the period when LFS coverage was broadest.
Participation rates for veteran male immigrants are generally close to those for natives, and even higher than for natives in Italy, Austria, Greece, and Spain. As many other researchers have found, our data generally show recent immigrants have lower participation rates than both natives and veteran immigrants.
On the other hand, the majority of male immigrants count themselves as in the labor force in every country.
The contrast between natives and recent immigrant is larger for women than for men in many countries. It is also worth noting that the participation rates for Yugoslavs are similar to those of other non-EU immigrant groups in most countries. In Sweden, for example, 79 percent of veteran Yugoslav men and 81 percent of other veteran non-EU men were in the labor force, while 65 percent of recent Yugoslav men and 62 percent of other recent non-EU men were in the labor force.
Unemployment is typically higher among immigrants than natives, so the difference in employment rates by nativity generally exceeds the difference in participation rates. This can be seen in panel B of Table   3 , which reports employment-to-population ratios. Most veteran immigrant men were working, and employment rates in most countries were similar for veterans who immigrated from former Yugoslavia and those who immigrated from other non-EU countries. The employment rates of recently arrived Yugoslavs were lower than those of veteran Yugoslavs, ranging from 27 percent for men in the UK, to rates above 75 percent in Austria, Greece, Luxembourg, and Spain. Again, the employment pattern of recent arrivals from Yugoslavia are typically similar to those of other recent immigrants from non-EU countries, though there are exceptions. The officially measured employment rates for immigrants generally increase with time in country. And, as we noted earlier, the distinction between officially-measured employment and labor force 12 The sample used to compare schooling levels omits Germany, Iceland, and Switzerland. 16 participation may not be clear-cut for immigrants.
Also relevant are the comparative skill and education levels of immigrants and natives, since there is probably more competition for jobs within groups than between groups. Our LFS extract includes information on the size of three schooling groups, categorized by International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) levels 0-2, 3-4, and 5 and above. ISCED level 2 typically denotes a ninth grade education, and corresponds to the end of compulsory education in many countries. We therefore define the "low-educated" as those with ISCED levels 0-2 and compare proportions in this group.
Averaging data for 1995 and 1999, about 33 percent of native men in our sample are in the loweducation group.
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The proportion is higher for veteran immigrants from non-EU countries, about 42 percent, with the proportion low-educated similar among recent non-EU immigrants at 40 percent. Recent immigrants from Yugoslavia are similarly less-educated, with about 39 percent in the low-education group. The proportion with low education is even higher among veteran male immigrants from Yugoslavia, roughly 48 percent. Almost half of non-EU female immigrants are low-educated (47 percent); likewise for recent Yugoslav women. The least educated group consists of veteran female immigrants from Yugoslavia, where 65 percent are less-educated. The immigrant/native contrast in schooling levels is larger for women than for men since only 37 percent of native women are in the low-education group. Overall, however, the education statistics show considerable overlap between the immigrant and native schooling distributions.
III. Estimates of Immigration Effects

A. OLS Estimates
The equation of interest links the employment rates of natives with the proportion of the labor force that is non-national or foreign born. In particular, we estimate
For the purposes of this distinction, we define "EU countries" on a time-invariant basis though EU membership was changing. See the appendix for details.
14 We look at the employment effects of immigrants who count themselves as in the labor force, i.e., working or actively looking for work but unemployed, as opposed to measuring immigrants as a proportion of population. This seems like a conservative approach to measuring the size of the immigrant group that can affect natives, since immigrants who can not legally work may nevertheless work illegally, while still reporting themselves as out of the labor force in surveys. Unemployed immigrants may also put downward pressure on native wages.
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for demographic group i, country j, and year t. The model includes country and year effects, β j and δ t , with group main effects included when demographic groups are pooled. The regressor ln(s jt ) is the log of the immigrant share and the dependent variable is the log of the employment-to-population ratio for natives. The immigrant share is defined as either the proportion of the labor force made up of non-nationals from non-EU countries, or the proportion of the labor force born in non-EU countries.
13
As noted above, we think of this equation as approximating the first-order condition determining native employment. This can also be seen as a general reduced-form relationship between native employment and the immigrant share. In either case, the most important omitted variables are time-varying productivity or labor demand shocks correlated with both immigrant shares and native employment.
14 The first set of estimates, reported in Table 4 , use data for 1992-99 only. This table briefly explores the consequences of switching from nationality-based to nativity-based definitions of immigrant status. For example, the first row shows a negative but insignificant relationship between the non-national share in the labor force and male nationals' employment rates. The estimates remain insignificant when pooled across age and schooling groups, when estimated separately for young and old workers, and when estimated in three separate schooling groups. Estimates using nationality definitions are likewise insignificant for women, though less precise as well.
The second panel in Table 4 shows that switching from a nationality-based to a nativity-based definition of immigrant status fails to generate any evidence of an employment-immigration relationship.
On the other hand, the third panel in the table, which replaces the non-native share with the proportion of the labor force consisting of immigrants who arrived in the last five years, shows a negative and significant 15 Card (2001) similarly argues that recent immigrants may be more likely than veteran immigrants to compete with less-skilled natives.
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effect on the employment rates of less-educated men. This finding is consistent with the view that recent arrivals are more likely than veteran immigrants to undercut less-skilled natives in the labor market. Veteran immigrants probably behave more like natives, with higher wages, and a higher probability of coverage by labor laws and collective-bargaining agreements.
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The magnitude of the effects for less-educated men is such that an increase in the recent immigrant share of 10 percent would reduce native employment rates by less than a third of a percent, or a little over 2/10 of a percentage point. On a per-worker basis, this estimate implies that 100 immigrants in the labor force cost about 30 native jobs.
The remainder of the analysis uses a nationality-based definition of immigrant status because nationality variables are available in our sample beginning in 1983, while the country-of-birth variables start in 1992. The longer period generates more precise estimates, facilitates control for country trends, and allows us to implement an instrumental variables strategy based on the Balkan wars. It should also be noted that the Balkan war instruments may disproportionately capture the effects of recent arrivals. Of course, recent arrivals have lower labor force participation than veterans, but our endogenous regressor includes only those immigrants who are in the labor force. Table 5 reports OLS estimates for the 1983-99 sample period, with additional estimates for 1992-99 for comparison. In addition to including more data, the model used to construct the estimates reported in Table 5 differs from equation (7) in that it also includes the share of the labor force from EU countries. That is, in addition to the log of the non-EU foreign share, ln(s jt ), the estimating equation also includes the log of the foreign share with EU nationality outside the country of residence, ln(u jt ). As noted earlier, many EU countries have a large number of foreign residents from other EU countries. These internal EU migrants are probably similar in some respects to US internal migrants, in that they are drawn to host countries by job assignments and employment opportunities.
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Figure 3 plots one non-national share variable against the other, after removing country and year effects. This figure shows that the EU and non-EU foreign shares are, in fact, positively correlated. This finding is similar to Pischke and Velling's (1997) results for Germany, which show that immigrants and natives seem to be attracted to the same locations. In our case, the positive correlation in the two foreign share variables suggests that migration within the EU does not act to "undo" the effects of non-EU migrants.
We nevertheless leave the EU share in some of the estimating equations as a proxy to control for omitted variables that might bias the OLS estimates. These omitted variables include host-country economic conditions that are likely to attract migrants.
Not surprisingly, the results for 1992-99 in Table 5 are similar to those for the same period shown in Table 4 , again offering no significant evidence of an immigrant-employment relationship. The only difference in specification here is the inclusion of the EU share variable, which is positively correlated with native employment. This positive correlation, however, is unlikely to be causal, and probably reflects the "pull" exerted by employment opportunities in one EU country on other EU residents.
Extending the sample back to 1983 changes the story somewhat. First, note that we no longer report estimates by schooling group in the extended sample because the schooling variables are unavailable in the LFS in the earlier period. Second, pooling the young and old age groups leads to a negative and statistically significant effect on male native employment of -.021. The difference between this result and that for the 92-99 sample is partly because the effect is larger and partly because it is estimated more precisely.
Estimates using young men only show an even larger negative effect of -.037. The pattern of estimates for younger women using 1983-99 data is similar, with more negative effects in the longer sample, though only the estimate for younger women is close to significant. Equation (7) relies on time-invariant country effects to control for omitted variables correlated with immigration rates. OLS estimates of the parameters in this equation are biased if immigration is correlated with omitted time-varying variables or country-specific trends, a problem that is likely to be worse with a 16 Schwartz (1973) is an early study documenting the impact of distance on migration.
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longer time-series sample. We therefore also report results replacing the country effect, β j , with a countryspecific linear trend, β 0j + β 1j t. The marginally significant negative employment effects for younger women become slightly larger and more precise in models with country trends, but the results for younger men, while still negative, are smaller, less precise, and no longer significantly different from zero. The estimates pooling age groups are negative but insignificant for both men and women in models with country trends.
B. IV Estimates
The OLS estimates for 1983-99 are all negative, though not significant in most of the models that are the excluded instruments, and τ t and ψ j are period and country effects. The distance from potential host countries is measured either from the nearest city with a population of at least 100,000 or from the capital.
In some specifications, we add the log of the EU foreign share (i.e., ln(u jt )) to this equation as an exogenous covariate. In practice, as we show below, this has little effect on the IV estimates because the EU share is largely uncorrelated with the instruments.
The essence of the IV strategy is to look for a break in the time-series behavior of employment rates for countries relatively close to Yugoslavia. Therefore, as a specification check, we also estimated models with a parametric controls for linear country-specific trends, as in the OLS models with trends in Table 5 .
The specifications with country trends replaces ψ j with ψ 0j + ψ 1j t in the first stage, in which case a corresponding term is also included in the second stage (β 0j + β 1j t) as an additional exogenous covariate.
Conditional on country and year effects, distance from former Yugoslav republics is associated with a sharply lower immigrant share in the war years. This can be seen in panel A of Table 6 , which reports the coefficients on b jt , n jt , and k jt , plus a pre-war interaction as a specification check. The coefficients are scaled so that they represent the effect of 1000 miles. Thus, the differential distance from Graz, Austria to Liege, Belgium, about 500 miles, reduces the non-EU foreign share during the Bosnia War by 30-40 percent (see columns 1-4 in the table).
The pattern of estimates in models without trends is consistent with the notion that immigration was highest during the war years, with a moderate decline in the inter-war years. Adding country trends changes the pattern somewhat, but the estimates are not precise enough for the change to be statistically meaningful.
It is perhaps to be expected that the inter-war reduction is not sharp since the inter-war and Kosovo war dummy are also correlated with the presence of Yugoslavs who stayed in their host countries. Importantly, however, the estimates in the last row in panel A shows that adding a dummy for pre-war years to the set of interactions generates no evidence of a pre-existing immigration trend associated with distance from Sarajevo for either distance measure.
As an additional check on the first stage, panel B of Table 6 shows the results of replacing the non-EU foreign share with the EU foreign share as the dependent variable in equation (8). That is, we replace ln(s jt ) with ln(u jt ). These estimates show no relationship between wartime interactions with distance to
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Sarajevo or Pristina and the EU share. This is encouraging since it suggests the estimates in panel A are really picking up the effect of immigrants from former Yugoslavia. Moreover, it means that when implementing the IV estimation strategy we can reasonably choose to ignore the possibly endogenous covariate, ln(u jt ), since this is essentially uncorrelated with the instruments. Finally, note that the first-stage estimates are generally similar whether distance is measured from capital cities or large cities. But because the first-stage relationship is stronger when distance is measured from large cities, we used this variable to construct the second-stage estimates discussed below.
The 2SLS estimates using b jt , n jt , and k jt as instruments are reported in Table 7 , separately for models that do and do not control for ln(u jt ). For men, the estimated effects are on the order of -.05 when age groups are pooled and -.08 for those under 40. IV estimates for men in models that include country trends are smaller, though still significant for those over 40. Adding the EU share as a control variable has little effect on the estimates in models that do not include country trends. In models with country trends, the estimates including the EU share are larger, but this turns out to be due to the fact that the estimates with country trends are sensitive to the change in sample (from 420 to 402 observations) when the EU share is included. The IV estimates for men are consistently negative, and larger in magnitude than the corresponding OLS estimates. Taking -.05 as a representative estimate, the IV estimates for men predict that increasing the foreign share by 10 percent would reduce employment by half of a percent. On a per-worker basis, this implies that 100 immigrants in the labor force cost about 75 native jobs, a large effect in levels, though in the range of the elasticity estimates summarized in Borjas (1994) . It should also be noted, however, that the estimates with country trends are mostly smaller and not significant.
While the 2SLS estimates for men are imprecise, they suggest a pattern of negative, reasonably stable effects. The results for women are harder to interpret. On one hand, the 2SLS estimates for women show very large negative effects, clearly too large to be attributable to the effects of immigrants. On the other hand, the estimates are greatly reduced by controlling for country trends. The coefficient on the exogenous EU The statistics quoted in this paragraph are for women aged 25-54 from Table C in OECD (2000) . Employment trends in our data are similar.
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share also falls sharply when trends are added to the models for women. In models with trends, the estimated effect of the non-EU share on the employment of young women is similar to that for men, while the estimates for older women are still larger. Note that percentage effects for women translate into effects on levels that are about half the size of those for men because of lower female labor force participation rates.
The marked sensitivity of the estimates for women to the inclusion of country trends suggests these estimates are probably driven by forces other than increased immigration. One problem with IV strategy for women is that some countries saw dramatic changes in female labor force participation (LFP) over this period while female LFP in other countries was more stable. In Italy, for example, employment to population ratios of prime-age women increased by only 3.3 percentage points between 1990 and 1998. Similarly, in Greece, female employment rates rose by just 4.5 percentage points. In Belgium, in contrast, which is much further away from Yugoslavia, female employment rates rose by 8.4 points. Similarly, in distant Ireland, female employment rates rose by 17.5 points. This sort of contrast in female employment growth probably induces a spuriously large IV estimate of immigration effects, since the trend growth was typically larger in countries farther from Sarajevo. For men, on the other hand, employment rates have been more stable, with less evidence of trends that differ sharply by country or region.
IV. Immigrants Interact with Institutions
In this section, we turn to an empirical investigation of the main question raised in the theoretical discussion in Section II: how does the impact of immigration on native employment vary with the restrictiveness of labor market institutions? In particular, do institutions that make labor markets more rigid or less competitive change the employment consequences of immigration for natives? The theoretical section suggests that restrictive labor standards that affect natives more than immigrants are likely to aggravate any 24 job losses from immigration, though firing costs may protect incumbent native workers from dismissal, at least in the short run. Higher replacement rates improve natives' non-work options, reducing employment levels, and therefore increasing native job loss. Reduced wage flexibility worsens the employment impact of immigrants because of scale effects and because rigid wages make native workers less competitive with immigrants. Finally, higher entry costs are also predicted to amplify the negative effects of immigrants on natives since new firms create jobs that would otherwise tend to neutralize any displacement effects. And entry costs that reduce employment levels also have a scale effect.
The OLS estimates of immigration effects discussed in the previous section may be biased towards zero because of endogenous migration, while some of the IV estimates are probably too large to be due solely to immigration, especially for women. This may be a consequence of omitted trends correlated with the instruments. We therefore continue to present results that control for country trends, as well as OLS estimates, which arguably provide a lower bound even if the instruments are contaminated. Our empirical strategy looks at OLS and IV estimates of interactions with measures of three of the institutional features discussed in the theory section. The first is a summary index of labor standards that reflects the extent of employment protection, restrictions on work hours and employment contracts, administrative or union oversight in hiring and firing decisions, and minimum wages. The second is the average replacement rate.
Both measures were taken from Table 4 in Nickell (1997) , and are repeated here in the data appendix. Labor standards are captured by an index ranging from 0-7, with 7 denoting the most restrictive institutions.
Replacement rates are measured in percent, ranging from 20-90 in our sample. Finally, we explore interactions with a measure of entry costs taken from Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud (2000) . This is an index of barriers to entrepreneurship ranging about .5-2.75 in our sample (reproduced in the appendix).
A. Estimates of Interaction Effects
The equation used to estimate interactions between immigrants and labor market institutions is 18 A recent OECD (1999b) study of employment protection shows a negative correlation between measures of protection and the employment of youth and prime-age women, with a positive relationship for prime-age men.
where x j is a variable characterizing institutions, measured as the deviation from the median institution value among the countries for which we have data on institutional characteristics. The parameter α 0i therefore captures the effect of immigration on demographic group i in countries with the median institution value, while the interaction term, α 1i , describes how this effect changes as institutions change. We therefore think of α 1i as the derivative of e(N, ε) with respect to institutional variables. When ln(s jt ) is treated as endogenous, the instrument list used to estimate equation (9) is augmented with interactions between x j and the instruments used to estimate equation (7). Note that this setup fails to identify the effects of the institutions themselves since our institution variables are time-invariant and absorbed by country effects.
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The analysis of institutions is limited to the sample of men since the 2SLS estimates for women are considerably more sensitive to control for country trends. As noted earlier, we believe this sensitivity is due to the strong country trends in female labor force participation. These trends appear to vary across countries in a manner correlated with distance from the Yugoslav conflicts.
The estimates of equation (9) for men suggest that immigration effects are probably more negative in countries with less flexible labor markets, higher replacement rates, and higher entry costs. The estimates, reported in Table 8 for specifications without country trends, begin with an analysis of institution interactions one at a time. The table reports estimates of α 0i , labeled "Main Effect" and α 1i , labeled "Interaction". The first column shows OLS results for men in both age groups. The interaction with labor standards in this specification is estimated to be a statistically significant -.0077, indicating that increasing the index of labor standards' severity by one unit would increase the negative effect of immigration from -.027 at the median to about -.035. The interaction terms are larger for young men than for men over 40. Similarly, the pooled interaction with replacement rates is -.0009, so a 10 percentage point increase in replacement rates would 26 increase the negative effect of immigration from -.027 at the median to -.036. The results of including both labor market interactions are reported in Panel B of the table. Including both interactions generates OLS estimates that are similar to, though somewhat smaller than, the estimates generated by including the interactions one at a time. Again, the effects are larger for older men.
The 2SLS estimates for men, reported in columns 4-7, differ from the OLS estimates in that both the main effects and interaction terms are less precisely estimated. The OLS and 2SLS estimates of main effects are similar for models that include interaction terms with labor standards. The 2SLS estimates of the interaction terms are much larger than the corresponding OLS estimates, however, and again negative and significant. The 2SLS estimates of interaction terms with replacement rates are not significant, and the 2SLS
estimates of main effects in models with replacement rate interactions are not significant. On the other hand, the 2SLS estimates of models incorporating interactions with both labor standards and replacement rates show significant negative interaction terms for labor standards in the pooled and young-men specifications, with insignificant negative interactions for replacement rates in all specifications.
As with the measures of labor market flexibility, the results of estimating models allowing interactions with entry costs show immigration effects that are more negative in countries with barriers to entry. For example, the pooled estimate in column (1) suggests that increasing entry barriers by .5, the difference between Sweden and Denmark, would increase the negative effect of immigration from -.027 at the median to -.043. The interactions with entry costs are again larger for men under 40, and larger when estimated by 2SLS. The results of our effort to estimate the interaction with entry costs jointly with interactions with labor market flexibility are less clear cut. OLS estimates of interactions with entry costs are similar in magnitude to the results when estimated one at a time, though no longer significant.
Interactions with replacement rates also remain significant and negative in this specification. The corresponding 2SLS estimates of interactions with entry barriers are much larger (i.e., more negative), perhaps implausibly so, though the interaction-term standard errors are also large.
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While our ability to distinguish specific institutional mechanisms is limited, the results show a pattern of negative interactions between immigration and institutional variables that reflect reduced labor and product market flexibility. As a further check on the results with institution interactions, we added country trends, as in the non-interacted models discussed earlier. This necessarily leads to a loss of precision since the interactions with institutions are correlated with country-specific linear trends. The results with country trends, reported in Table 9 , nevertheless show some evidence of negative interactions, and generate no significant positive estimates. For example, the OLS estimates of interactions with replacement rates are negative and significant, as is the 2SLS estimate of the interaction with replacement rates for older men.
These results hold up when replacement rates and labor standards are entered jointly and with entry barriers.
The 2SLS estimates of interactions with barriers to entrepreneurship are also negative and significant when this is the only interaction term.
V. Summary and Conclusions
This paper presents new evidence on the question of how immigration affects native employment.
The empirical analysis uses a cross-country panel for European countries with data on employment and immigration by demographic group since 1983. We are especially interested in exploring the extent to which any displacement effects of immigration are mitigated or amplified by reductions in labor market flexibility and business entry costs. Our analysis of immigration effects in Europe is facilitated by the availability of comparable employment and immigration statistics for different countries and demographic groups, and exploits instrumental variables derived from the immigration shock caused by the two Balkan wars.
The estimates reported here typically show that an increase in the foreign share of 10 percent would reduce native employment rates by .2 to .7 of a percentage point. The OLS estimates are at the low end of this scale, while the IV estimates are mostly larger, implying substantial displacement of native workers by immigrants. Such a large effect may be explained by the fact that there has been remarkably little aggregate employment creation in most of Western Europe in the last two decades, while immigrant employment has grown considerably. Since many immigrants work, their jobs may well have come at the expense of natives.
Of course, effects this large may also signal problems with the IV identification strategy, and the IV estimates
are not very precise. It therefore seems reasonable to interpret the OLS and IV estimates reported here as bracketing the true effect. In any case, it is worth noting that even the larger IV estimates of immigration effects would account for little of the increase in European unemployment rates overall.
Our main focus is on the question of whether measures of labor and product-market flexibility change the impact of immigration on native employment. This question has important policy ramifications since many Western European countries are preparing to accept more immigrants, and working to integrate previous immigrant cohorts more fully. Though restrictive institutions can play a protective role, our theoretical framework suggests that institutions such as firing costs, high replacement rates, rigid wages, and business entry costs, will likely aggravate the negative impact of immigration on equilibrium native employment. Part of this interaction is due to scale effects: institutions that reduce employment levels will tend to make the effect of a given number of immigrants worse. Higher entry barriers and reduced wage flexibility also have a direct effect that increases the impact of immigrants on native employment.
The empirical results offer some support for the view that reduced flexibility makes immigrant absorption more painful, at least when viewed from the perspective of native employment. Models that allow the impact of the foreign share on the employment of native men to vary with an index of labor market flexibility, replacement rates, and entry costs tend to show larger effects when flexibility is reduced and replacement rates and entry costs increased. These negative interactions are apparent in the OLS and many of the IV estimates, though the IV estimates of interaction terms are less precise, especially when country trends or more than one institutional characteristic is included in the model.
APPENDIX
Data
Data for Figures 1 and 2
The data plotted in Figure 1 are from OECD (1999) 
The Eurostat Labor Force Survey
The Eurostat LFS data set is documented in Eurostat (1998) and in a variety of memos released with these data. The LFS surveys are carried out by national statistical agencies according to guidelines issued by the European Community. The sampling frame in all countries covers only private households and not group quarters. This is probably important for the coverage of immigrants in some countries. Sampling rates, sample sizes, and interview methods (e.g., use of CATI/CAPI) vary from country to country. The LFS samples are stratified in a variety of ways, but the sample statistics we received from Eurostat were already weighted to population counts. We used these population weights to aggregate cell statistics where necessary (e.g., to combine age groups). Our estimates treat country statistics as population parameters, that is, we did not weight to adjust for differences in country size. We experimented with alternate weighting schemes and found weighted-by-population estimates to be similar. Response rates vary from a low of 55-60 percent in the Netherlands to 98 percent in Germany, with the median response rate at 87 percent. Labor force status is defined using a consistent definition based on "actual status in the reference week". We checked data quality and our processing by comparing statistics we constructed with those published in the OECD (2000) Employment Outlook.
Time-consistent Definition of immigrants' EU status
The analysis here distinguishes non-natives and non-nationals according to home country membership in the EU. This distinction is complicated in practice by the fact that the list of EU member countries changed a number of times over the sample period, and home countries are not always identified separately. Moreover, we cannot distinguish East from West Germany in the pre-unification period. Our analysis uses a time-consistent definition of EU membership, though this definition differs slightly for the 1983-99 and 1992-99 sample periods. For 1983-99, we define the EU as the original EU-12 plus Austria and
Norway. All immigrants from Germany are defined as EU (the results are not sensitive to the classification of German immigrants as being from a non-EU country). For 1992-99, we define the EU as the EU-15 plus Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland.
Cell Statistics and Confidentiality Edit
At our request, Eurostat provided us with tabulations of LFS cell statistics by country, year, age, schooling group, nationality, and nativity. Research data provided by Eurostat are released with the stipulation that cell statistics below country-specific thresholds not be released or used in statistical analyses.
The results reported here use only those cells above the disclosure thresholds, as determined by a table provided by Eurostat. The restrictions we used are those from "column A" of the Eurostat Guidelines table, as described in the latest release of the "New Chronos" data set.
Distance and Labor-Market Flexibility variables
Distance measures are as-the-crow-flies distance in miles from Sarajevo and Pristina to the capital city or the nearest city with a population over 100,000. Replacement rates and the labor standards index are from Nickell (1997;  
Derivation of short-run employment change, (5)
Differentiate the equilibrium condition, (4), with respect to I: The table reports estimates of the coefficient on log share of non-nationals or non-natives from non-EU countries in equation (7) in the text. All models include country and year effects. Pooled models include main effects for demographic groups. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The estimation sample for this table excludes Italy. The table reports estimates of the coefficient on log share of non-nationals from non-EU and EU countries in equation (7) in the text. All models include country and year effects. Pooled models include main effects for demographic groups. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. (7) in the text. The non-EU immigration-share variable is treated as endogenous, while the EU share variable is treated as exogenous. (9) in the text. All models include the EU foreign share as an exogenous regressor. Instruments for the foreign share are as in Table 7 , plus interactions with institutional measures. Main effects are evaluated at the median institution (5 for labor standards, 63 for replacement rates, and 1.72 for barriers to entrepreneurship). (9) in the text. All models include the EU foreign share as an exogenous regressor. Instruments for the foreign share are as in Table 7 , plus interactions with institutional measures. Main effects are evaluated at the median institution (5 for labor standards, 63 for replacement rates, and 1.72 for barriers to entrepreneurship). 7 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
